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''The Dashing Subaltern'' 
Sir Richard Turner in Retrospect 
Thomas P. Leppard 
When war came to Canada in August 1914, thousands rallied to the call to arms. 
Colonel Sam Hughes the charismatic and 
controversial Minister of Militia and Defence 
scrapped his department's meticulous plans for 
mobilizing the nation's militia and assumed 
control with amazing, albeit fortuitous, results. 
By September, 33,000 recruits were training at 
the hastily constructed Camp Valcartier, Quebec. 
A month later the first contingent of the legendary 
Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) sailed for 
England (the largest military force ever to cross 
the Atlantic up to that time). 1 
Hughes wanted a Canadian, preferably 
himself, to command the CEF but the British 
Commander-in-Chief, Lord Kitchener, told 
Hughes that the inexperienced Canadians needed 
a veteran General Officer Commanding (GOC) 
at the helm. To his credit, Hughes shelved his 
antipathy towards professional British officers 
and selected Lieutenant-General Sir Edwin 
Alderson from Kitchener's short list of British 
generals. 2 However, Hughes insisted that 
Canadians must command the nation's infantry 
brigades and Kitchener acquiesced. The 
Minister's first choice was one of Canada's best 
known soldiers -Richard Ernest William Turner; 
a successful Montreal business man, Tory hack 
and Boer war hero, where he had earned a 
reputation for reckless bravery and fiery courage 
in battle. 3 Turner commanded the 1st Canadian 
Division's 3rd Brigade at St. Julien in 1915, the 
2nd Canadian Division at St. Eloi and the 
Somme in 1916 and, thereafter, Canada's Forces 
in England. 4 
Turner ended the War Canada's senior 
ranking general, yet his career has been 
overshadowed by another brigadier-general 
Hughes appointed in 1914, Arthur Currie. From 
the start, Currie and Turner were the front 
runners to become the Canadian Corps' first 
indigenous GOC: a race the talented Currie won 
easily in June 1917. Currie's impressive 
battlefield record has made him the favourite of 
Canadian historians ever since.5 Turner, however, 
has become a historical castaway. A peripheral 
figure in several histories, Turner has yet to be 
the subject of a single biography, thesis or 
article. 6 Considering his spectacular feats, 
defeats and memorable controversies, he 
deserves better. 
Richard Turner was born in Quebec City 25 
July 1871 to Emily Marie Turner and the 
Honourable Richard Turner, a prominent Quebec 
businessman and Tory politician. Raised in 
middle-class Victorian affluence, Turner 
attended several private grammar schools before 
graduating from Quebec City High School in 
1889. Two years later he entered the family firm 
of Whitehead and Turner, Wholesale Grocers and 
Lumber Merchants, which he inherited in 1928.7 
His military career began in 1892 when, like 
many affluent and ambitious young gentlemen 
of his generation Turner joined the Canadian 
militia, commissioning as a subaltern in the lOth 
Queen's Own Canadian Hussars. Aided by Tory 
patronage and nepotism Turner advanced 
rapidly. In 1895 he made captain and major in 
1900. That same year he went to war. 8 
Within days of the outbreak of war between 
Britain and Paul Kruger's Boers, Prime Minster 
Wilfrid Laurier authorized the despatch of a 
volunteer force to South Mrica. 9 Eager to "have 
a go" at the Boers, Turner could only secure a 
berth to the Transvaal by accepting a demotion 
to lieutenant in the Royal Canadian Dragoons 
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(RCD). On reaching the Cape, the regiment was 
assigned to Brigadier-General Edwin Alderson's 
Mounted Infantry Brigade. 10 
Turner served with great distinction in South 
Mrica. He fought in at least eight major actions, 
was decorated twice, seriously wounded three 
times and was mentioned in despatches. This 
gained him a reputation for reckless bravery and 
made him a darling of the Canadian public.U 
His first decoration, the Distinguished Service 
Order, was won in May 1900 near Pretoria for 
"swimming the [Viet] river at a crucial juncture 
in the face of the enemy."12 Turner along with 
fellow RCD officer Harold Borden (Robert 
Borden's nephew) and five men swam their 
mounts, under fire, across the river and drove 
off an estimated 30 Boers. 16 In September, while 
serving as an intelligence officer near 
Wonderfonstein, Transvaal, Turner received the 
first of three serious gunshot wounds. Recovering 
quickly, he rejoined the RCD near Lillefontein 
in November. 14 
On 7 November 1900 Turner was part of a 
rear guard, that included two twelve pound field 
guns of "D" Battery, Royal Canadian Field 
Artillery, protecting General Smith-Dorrien's 
column when they were ambushed by 200 Boers. 
Badly outnumbered, Lieutenant H.A.C. 
22 
Officers of "B" Squadron, 
Royal Canadian Dragoons, 
ca.1900. 
Seated (l. to r.): Major 
V.A.S. Williams, Captain 
H.S. Greenwood. 
Standing (l. tor.): 
Lieutenant H.L Borden, 
Lieutenant C. T. Van 
Straubenzie and 
Lieutenant R.E. W. Thrner. 
Cockburn, a brother RCD officer, reacted 
instantly and formed a skirmish line that 
momentarily deflected the Boer onslaught. Killed 
or captured to a man, Cockburn's sacrifice 
bought Turner enough time to extricate the guns. 
But the Boers were soon in hot pursuit. A fierce 
running fight ensued. Turner's Colt machine 
gunner, Sergeant E. Holland, courageously 
manned his limber-mounted weapon until 
surrounded. Showing great presence, he then 
calmly lifted the gun from its mount and, cradling 
it like a football, grabbed a riderless horse and 
galloped away. The jubilant Boers, believing at 
first they had captured the gun, swarmed the 
carriage. Finding the weapon gone, they resumed 
the chase. 15 
The rugged Transvaal ponies quickly closed 
the gap because the horses towing the Canadian 
field guns became • blown' and slowed to a walk. 
With Boers swirling all about, Turner ignored a 
severe gunshot wound to his left arm and 
dismounted a dozen troopers for a desperate last 
stand. 16 Just then, he was hit again, this time in 
the neckY Trooper A.E. Hilder, a member of 
the rear guard, vividly recounted what happened 
next: 
The guns were in grave danger of being captured. 
Lieutenant Turner galloped up and shouted, 
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"Dismount and hold back the enemy!" I 
remember him distinctly saying "Never let it be 
said the Canadians had let their guns be taken." 
Again Lieutenant Turner galloped up, now 
seriously wounded in the neck and his arm 
shattered ... But, the important thing was, the 
guns had been saved by the stubborn resistance 
of the R.C.D. 18 
The episode reads like something out of 
Kipling. The handsome young subaltern, 
fearlessly defying death and the Queen's enemies 
to rally his men and save the guns. A grateful 
British High Command, still smarting because 
of the guns lost at Colenso, 19 awarded Turner, 
Holland and Cockburn, the Victoria Cross. 20 
Turner's citation reflected the High Commands' 
'gun loss' angst; 
On 7th November 1900, near Lillefonteln, two 
guns of the British column, rear guard to a 
convoy, were attacked by an overwhelming force 
of Boers, Endeavors were made to extricate the 
guns but with Boers following in pursuit in large 
numbers, the horses of the guns became very 
exhausted and came down to a walk. Lieutenant 
Turner with a part of the Royal Canadian 
Dragoons, although twice wounded, gallantly 
dismounted his men and from his personal 
initiative, succeeded in saving the guns. 21 
Invalided home, Turner arrived in Quebec 
City to a hero's welcome. On 1 7 September he 
received the Victoria Cross from the heir 
apparent, Edward, Duke ofYork. The investiture, 
part of a royal review of 5,000 militia troops, 
took place during a torrential downpour. 
Undaunted by the weather, thousands of Quebec 
City's grateful citizenry attended the ceremony 
and presented their famous son a privately 
subscribed gilded Sword of Honour. 22 Though 
not yet 30, Turner seemed the apotheosis of the 
pluck, courage, and tenacity that Canadians 
believed made their militia the world's best 
fighting men. 
A decade of promotions, awards, and 
honours followed his return to the peacetime 
militia. In 1902 he was breveted Lieutenant-
Colonel, received the Queen's medal with six 
clasps, and commanded the King's Royal 
Colonial Escort at Edward the VII's coronation.23 
Command of the 1Oth Hussars followed in 
January 1903 with his colonelcy confirmed in 
1905; from 1907 to 1912 Turner commanded 
the 3rd Eastern Townships Cavalry Brigade. On 
25 October 1911 he became Honourary Aide de 
Camp to His Majesty King George V, and in March 
1912 Turner ended two decades of militia service 
transferring to the Reserve of Officers. It proved 
a short - lived retirement. 24 
On 1 June 1914 Turner returned to the active 
service list retaining his previous rank of colonel 
at the behest of his friend, Sam Hughes. 25 As 
early as 1912 Hughes had predicted that war 
with Germany was inevitable and that Canada 
must be ready to stand with Britain. In the spring 
of 1914 he publicly declared that war was 
imminent. Events soon confirmed his prophecy. 26 
On 6 August 1914, two days after Britain 
declared war on Germany, Sam Hughes made 
Turner the CEF's first brigade commander. Sam's 
son Garnet, Turner's close friend, was named 
his Brigade Major. Hughes patronage 
notwithstanding, Turner's credentials were 
impeccable. Of the Canadian brigadiers who 
Hughes appointed, Turner alone had experience 
in both combat and brigade command. 27 At the 
age of 43, Turner was embarking on the challenge 
of his life, not as an adventure-seeking militia 
subaltern fighting Boer kommandos but as the 
brigadier of four thousand raw recruits about to 
face the world's foremost fighting machine- the 
Germany Army.28 
When the first contingent reached England 
in October 1914 they were an army in name only. 
Guided, once again, by Lieutenant-General 
Edwin Alderson' patient tutelage, the 1st 
Canadian Division began to take shape, but not 
without some growing pains. Enduring a winter 
of unprecedented misery on Salisbury's sodden 
plain was made worse by the constant meddling 
of Sam Hughes and his worthless Canadian-
made equipment. The division was eventually 
issued British kit and shipped to France in 
February 1915. On the eve of his departure for 
the front Turner broke several ribs in a car 
accident. Fearing that he would be replaced if 
he reported the injury, Turner told no one and 
shipped out in considerable pain.29 A month later 
the division made its immortal stand at St. Julien 
during the Second Battle of Ypres. As things 
turned out, Turner's first battle was almost his 
last. 30 
While Turner's personal courage and skills 
as a soldier were never in doubt, it quickly 
became apparent to his superiors that he was 
23 
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A pencil sketch oj Major-General Turner by K. 
Stratheroy around the time he was commanding 
2nd Canadian Injantry Division. 
ill-suited to command large formations in the 
field. This became evident at 2nd Ypres. On two 
occasions during the battle he had 
misinterpreted Alderson's orders and moved his 
brigadeJo the wrong position thereby exposing 
the left flank of Currie's 2nd Brigade. Mter the 
battle Alderson wanted Turner removed but Sam 
Hughes would not allow the British to sack his 
protege. Like Turner, Currie had preformed 
nervously in his first action as well. During a 
critical phase of the battle he had left his 
command post to search for reinforcements from 
the 27th Division. On reaching the 27th 
Divisional headquarters, he received a severe 
tongue-lashing from the division's GOC, Major-
General Snow who demanded Alderson remove 
Currie for leaving his post. But Alderson, 
recognizing Currie's potential, refused. In 
fairness to Currie and Turner, few generals win 
their first battle. In time, Currie learned how to 
command, but not Turner. However, in the 
meantime Hughes had even greater ambitions 
for Turner. In August 1915 he was promoted to 
24 
major-general and given command of the 2nd 
Canadian Division, the largest field force yet to 
be led into battle by a Canadian. 31 
The rapid expansion of the CEF from one to 
two divisions with a third division in the wings 
set the stage for the formation of the Canadian 
Corps in September 1915. Hughes wanted to 
command the Corps himself and keep his 
portfolio, but Prime Minister Borden told him 
to pick one or the other. 32 To the relief of Borden, 
the British High Command, and a growing 
number of Canadian (mainly Hughes appointed) 
officers disgruntled by his incessant meddling, 
the Minister kept the portfolio. If Corps 
command was not to be his, Hughes then wanted 
Turner to be the Corps' first Canadian GOC. 33 
Despite the Minister's persistent lobbying, this 
too was not too be. 34 Alderson got the Corps, 
Turner got the newly-formed 2nd Division and 
Currie replaced Alderson at the 1st Division. This 
~ , 
:55 promotion only served to further expose Turners 
t-.. shortcomings as a field commander. During the 
0:: 2nd Division's baptism of fire at the St. Eloi 
~ craters in April 1916, these deficiencies were 
largely responsible for " ... the first and worst 
Canadian setback of the war. "35 
Turner took command of the 2nd Division 
in England on 17 August 1915. In September 
they shipped to France where, after a two week 
apprenticeship, the division took over a section 
ofline south ofYpres, alongside the 1st Division. 
The 2nd Division's first winter passed in quiet 
misery: there was too much rain and too little 
action. The winter's major operations were a 
series of successful trench raids. One raid 
received British Commander-in-Chief, Sir 
Douglas Haig's, endorsement as a model 
operation. 36 However, the inactivity was about 
to end. 
On 2 March 1916 Turner was summoned 
by Sir Herbert Plumer, GOC 2nd British Army. 
He informed Turner that his division would 
support then relieve Major-General Alymer 
Haldane's 3rd British Division in a mining 
operation designed to excise the 700 metre St. 
Eloi salient from the southern rump of the Ypres 
salient. Turner protested. He wanted his untried 
division to lead the assault but Plumer replied 
that there was not time to train his men. The 
operation would proceed as planned. 37 
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At precisely 0415 hours on 2 7 March British 
engineers detonated six mines with a combined 
charge of 31,000 kilograms of ammonal directly 
beneath the German line. Debris and bodies were 
hurled skyward 50 metres obliterating a 
company of Bavarian jagers and several old 
landmarks. Trenches on both sides collapsed 
and trench drains backed up flooding thousands 
of shell holes and old craters. Ypres' few 
remaining windows rattled and the blast was 
heard in far offFolkestone, England. Before the 
first clods of earth had settled two fusilier 
battalions from Haldane's 9th Brigade sprang 
to the attack. In 40 minutes they secured the 
craters, advanced 200 meters, occupied the third 
German line and commenced consolidating. 38 
Despite the apparent good start, the left hand 
battalion had become confused and reported 
securing craters 4 and 5 when in fact they had 
misidentified crater 6 and another old crater 
(later christened crater 7) as craters 4 and 5. 
Atop the Messines-Wyschaete ridge the Germans 
spotted the error, filtered one hundred men 
through gaps in the British line and occupied 
crater 5 on 30 March. It took a week of desperate 
fighting before Haldane's under-strength 
battalions managed to capture crater 5.39 
In front of the craters things were a mess. 
Haldane's men held a series of disconnected 
water-filled shell holes and the shallow flooded 
remains of the German trench line. There where 
no dugouts. The German artillery had quickly 
found the range and pounded Haldane's exposed 
infantry inflicting heavy losses. Haldane had to 
relieve the survivors each night which proved to 
be a gruelling undertaking because the ground 
was a quagmire, the Germans shelled everything 
that moved, and the craters had been blown so 
close together that it made resupply, 
reinforcement and communication with the 
forward infantry companies virtually 
impossible. 40 
On 1 April Plumer accelerated Turner's relief 
of Haldane's exhausted division by 48 hours. The 
relief was complicated by the Canadian 
Government's request that its Corps remain 
intact. Thus Plumer had to relieve Fanashawe's 
V Corps with Alderson's Canadian Corps; the 
British Army's first corps-for-corps relief of the 
war. Turner relieved Haldane on the night of 3 I 4 
April without incidentY 
A smiling Turner shown shortly after his promotion 
to Lieutenant-General in mid-1917. The ribbonfor 
Turner's VC is clearly visible above his left breast 
pocket. 
Turner had led his inexperienced Canadians 
into a tactical nightmare. The battlefield was a 
bewildering muddy moonscape, the artillery was 
short of shells, the infantry carried the 
temperamental Ross rifle, communications in 
front of the craters were erratic, the German 
artillery dominated the battlefield, and the 
incessant rain had backed-up drains, flooded 
trenches, craters, and shell holes. Yet, what 
disturbed Turner most was that he had received 
no orders or instructions from his superiors. His 
only advice had been Haldane's handing over 
report. 42 Nevertheless, displaying his trademark 
grit and steely determination, Turner put his 
brigades to work consolidating the forward line. 
He confidently reported to Alderson that, given 
enough time, they would get the job done. 43 But 
time was short. 
Just before sunrise on 6 April, following 48 
hours of relentless bombardment, the Germans 
attacked with two battalions and routed Turner's 
25 
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ill-prepared Canadians from the forward line 
capturing craters 2, 3, 4 and 5. With his phone 
line cuts, Turner had been out of touch with the 
front until he went forward at mid-morning. He 
immediately ordered a series of ill-advised, 
uncoordinated, and costly counterattacks. 
Without effective artillery support and uncertain 
where the Germans were Turner's men hurled 
themselves valiantly at the craters. They were 
shot to pieces. At midday on 7 April, Turner's 
men reported they had captured craters 4 and 
5. In fact they had repeated the mistake made 
by Haldane's men and were actually in craters 6 
and 7. This mistake went undetected until 16 
April when the first aerial photographs in ten 
days revealed the truth. 44 
It is hard to understand why Turner and his 
staff did not discover the mistake sooner because 
the aerial photographs taken 8 April clearly 
showed that craters 6 and 7 were half full of 
water but not craters 4 and 5. Apparently no 
use was made of this obvious means of 
identifYing the positions held by the Canadians.45 
All efforts to recapture the craters failed. On 19 
April the Germans captured craters 6 and 7 and 
a week later Turner abandoned crater 1. The 
defeat cost the 2nd Division 1 ,400 casualties, 
the Germans 500.46 
To what extent was Turner responsible for 
the defeat? The odds seemed stacked against him 
from the start. His division was inexperienced, 
they carried a defective rifle, the artillery was 
short of shells, it rained incessantly, the 
battlefield was a featureless quagmire, 
communications were unreliable, and the 
German artillery hit anything that moved. Still, 
a sure-handed tactician might have turned the 
tables or reduced the odds, but Turner was not 
that man. In fact, he made several mistakes that 
made matters worse, notably his failure to 
correctly interpret the 8 April aerial photographs. 
The poor showing at St. Eloi convinced the 
British High command that their earlier 
assessment after 2nd Ypres that Turner was 
marginal field commander was correct. 47 
Alderson asked Sir Douglas Haig to sack 
Turner but once again Sam Hughes, abetted by 
the timely intercession of the "Canadian 
Eyewitness," Sir Max Aitken (Lord Beaverbrook), 
saved him.48 Aitken met with Haig on 23 April 
and they agreed that if Turner stayed Alderson 
26 
must go. A month later, on 28 May, Alderson 
was replaced by the capable and popular Julian 
Byng. Thus commenced a happy marriage 
between Byng and the Canadians that 
culminated a year later at Vimy. 49 
Nonetheless, St. Eloi was the turning point 
in Turner's checkered career as a field 
commander. The defeat so tarnished his 
reputation that not even Hughes could override 
British objections to his becoming the Canadian 
Corps GOC. He had been lucky to keep his 
division. 50 And then on 16 November 1916, 
Robert Borden fired Sam Hughes for 
insubordination. With Hughes out of the way, 
Canada's Overseas Minister, Sir George Perley, 
under increasing pressure from the British, told 
Borden that Canada must clean up the mess 
Hughes had made of the Canadian Army in 
England. The best solution, Perley continued, 
would be to appoint a "General Officer in 
command of Canadians in England with proper 
staff ... "51 Borden had little choice but to accept. 
Perley wanted Currie for the job but Currie was 
Byng's protege and likely successor and had 
shunned Perley's advances. Turner also fit the 
bill and, as Perley indicated to Borden, his Tory 
connections probably would make him "more 
popular with our following. "52 
Like Currie, Turner was reluctant to accept 
the job. Perley asked Borden to write a cable 
which he could use to entreat Turner to accept 
the post. 53 Borden's persuasive note, Turner's 
sense of duty, a firm shove from Byng, and 
Perley's tacit agreement that he was still a 
candidate for Corps Command, proved 
irresistible.54 Turner arrived in England on 27 
November and assumed his new post on 5 
December 1916. In June 1917, when Currie 
succeeded Byng as Corps GOC, Turner was 
passed over without being seriously considered. 
Sir Douglas Haig tried to soften the blow by 
making him senior to Currie when both were 
made Lieutenant-Generals on 23 June 1917.55 
Despite his disappointment, Turner's record 
in England was impressive. Though at times his 
subordinates found him to be hot-headed, 
irascible, and condescending, he proved a 
capable manager of men and material, laudably 
disentangling Hughes' bureaucratic labyrinth 
with sure handed professionalism. His lumber 
business experience likely provided the 
6
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administrative skills he used to clean up the 
mess left behind by his friend Sam Hughes.56 In 
short order he standardized and updated the 
infantry's training syllabus, sent home or to 
France a host of surplus officers, cleared out the 
logjam of reinforcements at the depot battalions, 
and mediated the medical corps' continual 
bickering. 57 
Some problems remained intractable but 
things in England did better and consequently, 
so did things in France. Thus Turner made a 
significant contribution in the transformation of 
the Canadian Corps into "much the best Corps 
in the British Army ... "58 
Relations between Currie and Turner were 
another matter. Competitors for Corps 
command, the antipathy between the two men, 
which had never been far below the surface, 
resulted in several memorable spats. A slightly 
paranoid Currie believed that Turner and his 
staff were his real enemy, trying to usurp his 
command prerogatives. In fairness to Turner, 
Currie's charges were groundless and whatever 
he personally thought of Currie, Turner never 
allowed their animosity to interfere with the 
welfare of the Corps. In fact, he supported Currie 
on every major issue, most significantly the 
controversial break up of the 5th Division in early 
1918. Even after the war Turner, on several 
occasions, publicly defended Currie's 
reputation. 59 
Turner's much publicized defeat at St. Eloi 
confirmed his shortcomings as a field 
commander. In battle, a divisional commander 
must be an imperturbable manager of men, 
material and chaos. Unfortunately he was never 
able to manage the chaos inherent in battle. 
Controlling this confusion over an erratic 
telephone system, deciphering a stream of 
conflicting reports, calming panicky officers, 
restoring order, and making the correct tactical 
decision more often than not, was beyond 
Turner's ken. In that sense Turner was the 
quintessential amateur soldier: a leader and a 
fighter, not the manager that modern war 
required. St. Eloi confirmed that Richard Turner 
forever remained the dashing subaltern whose 
fearless courage and fiery presence inspired men 
and made him one of Canada's most famous 
soldiers at the turn of the century. 
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